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The thrust of many recent Supreme Court decisions that have
limited the role of the federal securities laws has been a fear of undue
federalism.1 The other articles in this symposium2 evidence the con-
tinued tension in securities regulation at both the state and federal
levels. The courts in interpreting the securities laws have long been
struggling to strike the proper balance between federal and state in-
fluence. One point of distinction is the dividing line between state blue
sky laws and federal acts.' Another point of departure is between the
federal role of investor protection and the states' corporate chartering
function.4 State law also has a role to play in investor protection, as is
the case with insider trading.
State securities regulation not only involves the enforcement of blue
sky laws and tender offer legislation, but also includes the enforcement
*This article is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of insider trading.
The interested reader should consult the authorities in note 11 infra. The purpose of this
piece is to present a basis for reconciling the recent federal decisions and the common law of
fiduciary responsibility.
**Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A. 1969, J.D.
1972 Columbia University. The author would like to thank Professor Robert G. Byrd for his
helpful comments; the author takes sole responsibility for any mistakes and the views ex-
pressed herein.
I See, e.g., Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New
Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980); Hazen, Implied Remedies Under Federal
Statutes: Neither a Death Knell nor a Moratorium- Civil Rights, Securities Regulation,
and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980).
2 See Johnson, Preface for the Annual Review of Securities and Commodities Law,
39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 821 (1982); Pickholz & Horahan, The SEC's Version of the Efficient
Market Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943
(1982); Rapp, Rule 10b-5 and "Fraud-on-the-Market"-Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 861 (1982); Stassen, The Commodity Exchange Act in Perspective, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 825 (1982); and Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
899 (1982).
" See, e.g., Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 899 (1982). The
Supreme Court's most recent effort to balance federal and state law influence involves the
preemption of state tender offer statutes by the federal Williams Act. See Edgar v. Mite
Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982), affg sub noa. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
'See Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suf-
frage, Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 391
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Hazen].
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of traditional common law principles and state court enforcement of
federal law.' The increasing concern of halting a creeping federalism
should not be used as a guise for unduly restricting the advances that
have been made in curtailing unscrupulous activity with regard to trans-
actions in securities. One frequently forgotten avenue is the common
law. This article will explore the relevance of common law theories to
one aspect of securities regulation-insider training.
II. THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING
Some commentators have suggested that when corporate insiders
trade in their company's securities, the use of inside information pro-
motes market efficiency.' However, the bulk of authority is to the con-
trary,7 and this support for sanctions against insider trading no doubt
represents the proper view. Even in the face of today's overworked,
understaffed, and increasingly more laissez faire Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC or Commission), the SEC is pursuing insider
trading violations with a vengeance." In contrast to the SEC's vigor, the
Supreme Court struck a severe blow against effective policing of insider
trading in Chiarella v. United States.9 As will be developed more fully
below, this decision, although certainly consistent with the Supreme
Court's limiting trend,10 does not foreclose federal remedies. Further-
more, the Chiarella decision forces a re-examination of the common law
remedies against insider trading.
In recent years there has been a great deal of controversy concern-
ing the legality of corporate insiders trading in the shares of their com-
pany. The common law did not deal adequately with insider trading. Ac-
cordingly, federal securities legislation supplemented by judicial inter-
pretation began to fill the void. Recent federal decisions, however, have
cut back on the general thrust of the securities laws and in particular the
regulation of insider trading. In light of these recent limitations and the
state law avenues that might be available, it is appropriate to reconsider
the limitations on insider trading. Commentators" and the courts" are in
I See Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal Courts for
Private Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 60 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1982).
' See generally H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Wu, An
Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUm. L. REV.
260 (1968); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977).
7See authorities cited in note 11 infra.
'See, e.g., Longstreth, SEC Battle Against insider Trading Is Worth the Effort,
Legal Times of Washington, May 10, 1982, at 16.
445 U.S. 222 (1980). See text accompanying notes 31-43 infra.
"See Hazen, The Supreme Court and the Securities Laws: Has the Pendulum Slowed?,
30 EMORY L.J. 5 (1981).
" See generally Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10-b5, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 1307 (1981); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Conant, Duties of Disclosure of
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conflict as to both the propriety and extent of legal controls that should
govern corporate insiders who trade in their company's own stock with
advance knowledge of information not generally available to the in-
vesting public. It is the thesis of this article that insider trading should
be severely curtailed and controlled by the federal securities acts and
that state law offers opportunities for filling the gaps that currently ex-
ist under federal law.
The development of legal limitations on insider trading at both com-
mon law and under SEC Rule 10b-513 have striking parallels. The early
common law cases held that in a faceless market insiders had no duty to
refrain from trading in their corporation's stock when armed with
material inside information. 4 The courts, however, were willing to
recognize a cause of action where the director traded with the plaintiff
directly or through an agent as opposed to dealing through a faceless
market.'5 In these early cases the courts stressed that the buyer and
Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960); Dooley, Enforcement
of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy,
An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 798 (1973); Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the
Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Haft]; Jennings, In-
sider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations
Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 809 (1968); Langevoort, Insider Trading and the
Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1982); Morrison,
Silence is Golden: Trading on Nonpublic Information, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 211 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Morrison]; Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule 10b-5, 1971 U. ILL.
L.F. 55 (1971); Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock
Markets: Who Is Harmed and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 54 So. CAL. L.
REV. 1217 (1981).
1 Compare, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (recog-
nizing civil liability under SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981)); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (same); Financial In-
dus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
874 (1973); Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (recognizing a com-
mon law remedy); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1969) (same) with Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978) (denying a common law
remedy); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977)
(denying a 10b-5 remedy); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975) (denying common law
remedy). For other cases recognizing a private remedy for insider trading see, e.g., Tarasi v.
Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977) (discussing
the in pari delicto defense); Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying com-
mon law principles to hold tippees liable), vacated sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386 (1974). Cf. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (criminal conviction
for illegal insider trading).
13 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). See Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation
of Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAW. 947 (1976).
" See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Carpenter v. Danforth
52 Barb. (N.Y.) 581 (1868).
See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir.
1952); Sampson v. Hunt, 222 Kan. 268, 564 P.2d 489 (1977); Hotchkiss v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530,
16 P.2d 531 (1932); Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 57, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967).
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seller were in privity; in the case of a faceless market, however, many
courts held the investor's injury was too remote.16 The common law was
reluctant to impose an affirmative duty to disclose in the face of silence,
the theory being that fraud should be limited to misstatements as opposed
to mere nondisclosure.17 However, the cases became increasingly more
likely to recognize "special facts" that trigger an insider's duty to
disclose prior to trading in his corporation's stock.18 Most recently, a few
cases have recognized a much stricter duty at common law.19 As will be
developed more fully below, the recent common law decisions that im-
pose strict limitations upon insider trading represent the logical
culmination of the law's development. They are not novel, but rather are
grounded in sound basic principles.
On the federal front, corporate insiders' duty to wait until disclosure
of nonpublic information before trading in their company's stock
developed rapidly in the 1960s."° In the seminal administrative ruling in
Cady, Roberts & Co.," the SEC disciplined a broker-dealer who had
given favored customers nonpublic information about an impending divi-
dend cut in a publicly traded stock. The Commission reasoned that,
although the broker was not an insider of the corporation, he had been
tipped by an insider, and thus his passing on the tip "at least violated
[Rule 10b-5(3)] as a practice which operated as fraud or deceit upon the
purchasers [of the securities sold by the tippees]." The next major in-
1" See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Peek v. Gurney,
1873 L.R. 6 H.L. 377.
11 E.g., Keates v. Earl of Cardogan, 1851, 10 C.B. 138, 138 Eng. Rep. 234; Windram
Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E. 454 (1921); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 695-96 (4th ed. 1971). The rule that fraud should be limited to
misstatements is based in part on a supposed distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance and has been subject to much erosion.
" See, e.g., Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 426 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (purchasing
shareholders of close corporation required to inform selling shareholder of negotiations with
another corporation to buy close corporation at higher per share value), rev'd, 588 F.2d 202
(6th Cir. 1978); Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, 492 P.2d 43 (1972)
(disclosure required even where sale negotiations between buyer and seller not yet finalized);
Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 224 (1945) (insider's failure to disclose negotiations
leading up to dissolution of business); Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N.E.2d 630
(1945) (nondisclosure to seller of stock of "assured sale" of corporate business); Sampson v.
Hunt, 222 Kan. 268, 564 P.2d 489 (1977) (nondisclosure of corporate affairs by insider direc-
tor purchasing shares from nonmanagement shareholder). See also W. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 714-15 (5th unab. ed. 1980).
1" See authorities cited in note 12 supra.
2 See note 6 supra.
21 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). For more detailed descriptions of both the common law and
federal developments see the authorities cited in note 1 supra.
2 40 S.E.C. at 913. The Commission explained that "[alnalytically, the obligation rests
on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or in-
directly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of any one, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing." Id. at 912.
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sider trading decision was by the Second Circuit in a SEC enforcement
action." That court in the landmark Texas Gulf Sulphur case held that
corporate insiders who had purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock on the
open market while possessing nonpublic knowledge of a valuable mineral
find had violated Rule 10b-5.24 The court found a federal law violation
since the information not disclosed was, at the time of the transactions
complained of, material to a reasonable investor's decision whether or
not to purchase the stock in question.?
The next extension in the federal jurisprudence, although subse-
quently rejected by some courts, was to hold that a tip of inside informa-
tion gives rise to liability for fraud on the market."8 One court went so
far as to hold, in a decision that would be questionable today, that even
noninsider tippees who sell relying on confidential inside information
have violated Rule 10b-5 and thus must disgorge their profit.' The Ninth
Circuit held a financial columnist liable to a purchaser of stock where the
columnist had purchased stock at a discount prior to making a public
"buy" recommendation that was based on an overly optimistic view of
the company.' It is against this background that the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Chiarella. The cases which impose a strict
view of the federal law against insider trading have been characterized
as creating an informational rather than fiduciary duty," an interpreta-
tion which is most questionable in light of Chiarella.10
Much of the federal expansion of liabilities for insider trading was
brought into question by the Supreme Court decision in Chiarella.1 In
Chiarella, the Court held that in an open-market transaction, a noncor-
porate insider has no duty to disclose inside information, at least where
the information is "market information" as opposed to fundamental in-
formation relating to the company's condition. 2 The defendant Chiarella
" SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
2 Id. at 852.
Id. at 849-52.
24 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,'Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
Accord, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). Contra Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). The fraud on the
market theory of liability extends beyond insider trading cases. See Rapp, Rule 10b-5 and
"Fraud-on-the-Market"-Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
861 (1982).
Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.
1974). Cf. Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3rd Cir. 1977) (discussing the
defense of in pari delicto).
' Zweig v. Hurst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). The activity complained of-pur-
chasing a security prior to publicly recommending it-is known as "scalping". See, e.g., SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1982), quoted in the text accompany-
ing note 43 infra.
3 See text accompanying notes 31-43 infra.
SI Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Id. at 233-37.
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was an employee of a printing firm that had been used in connection
with various tender offers. In an effort to maintain confidentiality the
target company's identity was concealed in the galleys. Chiarella, who
worked on the galleys, would identify the target company by reading the
other information in the tender offer material. Armed with this
knowledge Chiarella would purchase the target company's stock and
then sell it at a profit after the tender offer was announced publicly."
The federal indictment was framed in terms of what was characterized
as Rule 10b-5's requirement that an insider possessed with confidential
material information must either disclose or abstain from trading.' The
defendant was convicted but the Supreme Court overturned the convic-
tions on the ground that there was no legal duty to speak."
The Court first distinguished the earlier "disclose or abstain" deci-
sion of the SEC in Cady, Roberts" on the ground that the insider trader in
Cady, Roberts had wrongfully obtained information from a corporate in-
sider while in the special position of broker-dealer.37 According to the
Chiarella Court, the Cady, Roberts decision thus "recognized a relation-
ship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation
and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason
of their position with that corporation."' There is ample authority for
the proposition that persons who are not traditional corporate insiders
may be held accountable under Rule 10b-5 when occupying a special posi-
tion in the market place that puts them under SEC supervision, especially
when these persons knowingly obtain confidential information from cor-
porate insiders. 9 In such cases it is the possession of information coupled
with a special position that triggers the Rule 10b-5 duty.
Another aspect of most insider trading decisions is the wrongful ap-
propriation of the inside information. The Chiarella Court explained that
the Second Circuit's "disclose or abstain" rule as announed in Texas Gulf
Sulphur and its progeny" was limited to insiders (and others) where
there is a basis for imposing a duty to disclose apart from the mere
possession of confidential inside information.4 In summarizing its
'* Id. at 224. The defendant engaged in five similar transactions realizing an aggregate
profit of approximately $30,000. Id.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 233-37.
See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
445 U.S. at 226-28.
Id. at 228 (footnote omitted; emphasis supplied).
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Dirks v. SEC,
681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Investors Management, Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
' See note 12, 23-28 supra.
, 445 U.S. at 229-31. Compare Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524
F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975) (no liability for failure to disclose intent to continue large pur-
chases of target company's stock) with American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493




holding the Supreme Court explained that the absence of a wrongful con-
version or misappropriation of the information in question dictated that
there could be no violation of Rule 10b-5 since there was no legal duty to
disclose prior to trading.42 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has observed:
Therefore, reading Chiarella in light of the case law that preceded
it, and extracting those views that seem to command a clear ma-
jority of the Court, we take the following lessons from Chiarella:
Rule 10b-5 and its statutory sources, standing alone, do not re-
quire "any person" who is a party to a securities transaction to
disclose all material, nonpublic information or refrain from
trading, and a mere failure to disclose material information, ab-
sent other compelling legal circumstances, does not "operate as a
fraud." Thus, the "information" theory is rejected. Because the
disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a
party has legal obligations other than a mere duty to comply
with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities
laws."
By focusing on the legal source of the asserted duty to disclose, the
Supreme Court in federal securities cases has highlighted the impor-
tance of the common law in the area. The Chiarella decision thus ex-
pressly incorporates common law theories of liability into Rule 10b-5's
duty to speak. Such theories of liability have been lying dormant and
now stand to be revived in both federal and state court forums. In the
state courts, the common law can provide an alternative to the 10b-5
claim. In federal court, common law principles will be applicable at least
by analogy.
Injecting the common law into the 10b-5 cases can raise ticklish ques-
tions. For example, is the federal court to find a general common law ap-
plicable to 10b-5 or must it defer to the appropriate state law? Specifically,
when the law of the states varies as to the scope of the common law duty
to speak, the result under 10b-5 would vary depending upon the local law
governing the transaction in question. This result, of course, precludes
uniformity in the federal courts, but is an approach many courts have
adopted in Rule 10b-5 corporate mismanagement cases.44 On the other
hand, to apply federal law on the issue of duty could impose a higher
42 445 U.S. at 231 (The "market information upon which he relied did not concern the
earning power or operations of the target company, but only the plans of the acquiring com-
pany").
'3 Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
In the following corporate mismanagement cases, the courts have recognized a 10b-5
claim based upon nondisclosure of facts that would have alerted the plaintiff to a potential
cause of action under state law. Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3rd
Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d
602 (5th Cir. 1979); Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d
236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). But cf. Biesenback v. Guenther, 588
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standard than some states,45 and the Supreme Court has forbidden this
result in another 10b-5 context.46
III. THE PROPER ROLE FOR THE COMMON LAW
The major premise of this article is that the stage has now been set for
renewed application of common law theories of liability to cases involv-
ing insider trading. The United States Supreme Court in Chiarella prop-
erly focused upon the obligations of those possessed with material inside
information to the investing public. This focus is appropriate since the
thrust of the federal securities laws is investor protection.47 However,
there are alternative bases for the duty to disclose. For example, what
about the insider's obligation to the corporation? Is not the fiduciary duty
of the director, or any corporate agent, one that properly runs to the
principal? This approach, which has firm support, has been the theory of
recovery of insider profits in a handful of cases that have met con-
siderable resistance.48 It is this author's thesis that these decisions are
not novel but in fact reflect long observed, traditional common law prin-
ciples and thus do and should provide an effective weapon against the
premature use of material inside information. The "disclose or abstain
from trading" rule is a weapon that has an appropriate place both in
state and federal law.
It has long been the rule that where an insider fails to disclose
material information to a purchaser or seller of shares in a face-to-face
transaction many courts will impose liability for fraud.49 The courts have
applied this rule most often in cases where controlling shareholders,
directors, or officers have entered into transactions with existing
shareholders."0 In such a case there is an already existing fiduciary rela-
tionship between the parties to the transaction. However, in open
market transactions the courts have generally held that under principles
of common law fraud there is no duty to disclose between buyer and
seller.5' This doctrine is important insofar as Rule 10b-5's deception re-
quirement incorporates elements of common law fraud.2 It is thus not
F.2d 400 (3rd Cir. 1978); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Del. 1978). See
generally Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement and the Federal Securities Act's Antifraud
Provisions: A Familiar Path with Some New Detours, 20 B.C. L. REv. 819 (1979).
" See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739
(Fla. 1975).
4" Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (dealing with corporate
mismanagement).
17 See Hazen, supra note 4, at 391.
"8 See authorities cited in note 12 supra.
" See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
- See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); Ragsdale v. Ken-
nedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974).
11 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Peek v. Gurney,
1873 L.R. 6 H.L. 377.
52 E.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter must be proven as part of any 10b-5
claim); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (actual deception requirement);
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surprising that the federal courts are far more receptive to cases involv-
ing face-to-face transactions than those based upon a faceless market.'
In contrast to the cases based upon a fraud theory, cases applying
the common law of agency have recognized an insider's duty to abstain
from trading without disclosure of material inside information. 4 Under
an agency law theory, however, the duty runs to the principal-to the
corporation-rather than to sellers, purchasers, or the investing public
in general. Although grounded in traditional fiduciary principles, this
line of insider trading cases did not surface until relatively recently.
The first expansive common law case arose in Delaware, a state not
known for its strict view of corporate fiduciary duties." In Brophy v.
Cities Services Co.,;6 the "confidential secretary" to an officer and direc-
tor, who himself served in "an executive capacity,"57 knew in advance of
the company's intent to purchase its own stock on the open market. The
defendant purchased shares for his own account before the company's
purchases had the anticipated effect of causing the market price to rise
significantly. The Delaware court held the insider accountable for his
profits but did not rely on the line of cases holding the directors liable to
purchasers and sellers." Rather, the court based its holding upon
fiduciary obligations to the corporation. As such, the decision is more in
line with a fiduciary, as opposed to an informational, duty to disclose or
abstain from trading. 9 The court in Brophy relied upon both restitu-
tionary principles" and the law of trusts6 ' in concluding that where "an
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter must be proven as part of any
10b-5 claim).
Compare, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (face-to-
face transaction, 10b-5 liability imposed) with Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
(market transaction, no 10b-5 violation).
"E.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969);
Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
nSee generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Murdock, Delaware: The Race to the Bottom-Is the End in Sight?, 9
Loy. CHI. L.J. 643 (1978); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation
Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861 (1969).
31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
"Id. at 243, 70 A.2d at 8.
"See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 29 & 41-43 supra.
"See 31 Del. Ch. at 245,.70 A.2d at 7-8. The Brophy Court quoted from RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 290, Comment a (1937):
The general rule with respect to the rights and duties of a fiduciary appears in the
Restatement of the Law of Restitution (§ 200, Comment a); "A fiduciary is subject
to a duty to the beneficiary not to use on his own account information confidential-
ly given him by the beneficiary or acquired by him during the course of or on ac-
count of the fiduciary relation or in violation of his duties as fiduciary, in competi-
tion with or to the injury of the beneficiary, although such information does not
relate to the transaction in which he is then employed, unless the information is a
matter of general knowledge...'
31 Del. Ch. at 245, 70 A.2d at 7-8.
" 31 Del. Ch. at 245, 70 A.2d at 8. The Brophy Court quoted from A. SCOTT, THE LAW
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employee acquires [inside] knowledge in the course of his employment,
the application of general principles would seem to require the conclu-
sion that he cannot use that information for his own personal gain." 2 The
applicable provision of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution pro-
vides: "where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary ac-
quires property through the use of confidential information, he holds the
property so acquired upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary."'
The rationale thus treats inside information like any other piece, of cor-
porate property, be it tangible or intangible like a trade secret."
The law of trade secrets, although protecting a principal's property
right in information, is not directly relevant to insider trading because in
the trade secret cases disclosure puts the principal at a competitive
disadvantage. This competitive disadvantage can result in a presumed
injury. There is no presumed injury in the context of insider trading.
However, actual loss is not a requirement of many causes of action based
upon breaches of fiduciary duty. For example, when a corporate official
deals with his or her corporation, the transaction is voidable unless
there has been full disclosure to a disinterested decision-maker. 5
Another example of the absence of a provable loss requirement is in the
kick-back cases. An employee who receives a kick-back for placing a con-
tract with his or her principal must disgorge that profit to the principal
even if the contract price was fair and would have been the same in an
arm's length bargain.6 A third type of fact pattern where the courts re-
OF TRUSTS, § 505.1 (1939):
When, therefore, a person "in a confidential or fiduciary position, in breach of his
duty, uses his knowledge to make a profit for himself, he is accountable for such
profit .. " Scott on Trusts, § 505.1, supra.
31 Del. Ch. at 247, 70 A.2d at 8. See also Note, Confidential Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 15
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 87 (1946); Note, Protection and Use of Trade Secrets, 64 HARV. L. REV.
976 (1951).
82 31 Del. Ch. at 245, 70 A.2d at 8.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 200 (1937).
It is well established that the law will protect a business' right to informational prop-
erty such as trade secrets and will hold others accountable for any profits gained from
unauthorized disclosure. See, e.g., 12 R. MILGRAM, TRADE SECRETS chs. 3 & 4 (1973); A.
TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS pt. IV-B (1962).
8 See Wyman v. Bowman, 127 F. 257 (8th Cir. 1904); Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v.
Peteler Car Co., 132 Minn. 217, 156 N.W. 255 (1916); Johnson v. Duensing, 340 S.W.2d 758
(Mo. Ct. App. 1960), mod. on other grounds, 351 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1961); Point Trap Co. v.
Manchester, 98 R.I. 49, 199 A.2d 592 (1964). See also ALI-ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 41.
In those jurisdictions adopting the Model Act fairness alone arguably validates a self-
dealing transaction by corporate officials even in the absence of full disclosure. In those
cases where there is no showing of transactional fairness the contract is voidable regardless
of whether the agent has profited or whether the principal has suffered a provable loss. See
generally Anderson, Conflicts of Interest Efficiency, Fairness, and Corporate Structure, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 738 (1978); Bulbulla & Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors'
Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW 201 (1977).
" See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing & Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 334 (D.




quire disgorgement of an ill-gotten profit although no injury is proven is
in the bribery of an agent. The agent must disgorge the bribe even
though he or she can prove that his or her actions would have been the
same without the bribe and thus that the principal did not incur a pro-
vable injury.
6 7
The theory in all of the foregoing fiduciary duty cases is that the
agent should not profit in a conflict of interest situation. As explained in
the Restatement of the Law of Restitution, the rule "is not based on
harm done to the beneficiary in the particular case, but rests upon a
broad principle of preventing a conflict of opposing interests in the
minds of fiduciaries, whose duty it is to act solely for the benefit of their
beneficiaries."6'8 The rule purportedly acts to deter conduct that has the
potential for abuse. When a corporate official trades in stock on the basis
of inside information, he or she now has a dual interest: to profit from
the transaction and to act in the corporation's best interest. Although no
actual injury to the corporation may occur, the conflict is there just as
with a bribe or kick-back. Moreover, when an investor learns that cor-
porate insiders are using confidential information to their own advan-
tage, the investor may have less trust in the company, thus adversely af-
fecting both public confidence in the company and the saleability of the
company's stock. 9 In such circumstances, the company would suffer ac-
tual financial harm the next time the company had to raise additional
capital.
Arguably, a potential conflict arises whenever an insider trades in
the securities of his or her company. However, there are gains from
allowing an insider to invest, such as giving the insider a self-interest in
the company's success. It would be totally unrealistic to bar insider
trading, especially when the long term goals of the insider and corpora-
tion coincide-a successful enterprise and a high priced stock. But when
the insider seeks a short-term profit based on fluctuations in the com-
pany's stock, the conflict develops. The federal law applicable to public
companies, therefore, expressly requires disgorgement of insider profits
realized as a result of a purchase and sale within six months regardless
of proof of the use of inside information.7 1 When an insider relies on in-
side information in making a trade, his or her short-term investment in-
terests are being placed in potential conflict with the corporation's in-
terest. The agent is thus put in a dual role that is traditionally forbidden.
Although firmly grounded in traditional concepts, the Brophy
" See Fuchs v. Bidwell, 31 Ill. App. 3d 567, 334 N.E.2d 117 (4th Dist. 1975) (bribery of
public official). Cf. Continental Management, Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613 (Ct. Cl.
1975) (action by principal against person giving the bribe who was not its agent).
" RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 197, Comment c (1937).
9 See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y. 494, 499, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81-82, 248 N.E.2d 910,
912-13 (1969).
70 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1981). See Hazen, The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1975).
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reasoning did not resurface until twenty years later in the New York
Court of Appeals' decision in Diamond v. Oreamuno.7 In Diamond, the
two defendants, the company's chairman of the board and president,
knew of certain impending cost increases that would deflate anticipated
earnings. The two insiders sold their holdings in the company prior to
any public disclosure. The court, picking up where the Brophy decision
left off, held both defendants liable to the corporation for their ill-gotten
gain.72 Chief Judge Fuld, after citing Brophy with approval, pointed to
the law relating to principal and agent:
[A] similar view has been expressed in the Restatement 2d,
Agency (§388, comment c):
"c. Use of confidential information. An agent who acquires
confidential information in the course of his employment or in
violation of his duties has a duty ... to account for any profits
made by the use of such information, although this does not harm
the principal .... So, if [a corporate officer] has 'inside' informa-
tion that the corporation is about to purchase or sell securities,
or to declare or to pass a dividend, profits made by him in stock
transactions undertaken because of his knowledge are held in
constructive trust for the principal.""3
The Restatement does not require injury to the principal as a pre-
requisite to a cause of action. Presumably, the absence of an actual in-
jury requirement is based on the idea that a breach of trust necessarily
damages the principal or cestui qui trust. Nevertheless, Judge Fuld
pointed out that the corporation is injured whenever its integrity has
been impugned.7
Notwithstanding the common law basis for the foregoing Delaware
and New York decisions, two subsequent cases have rejected the
Brophy-Diamond rationale. In Schein v. Chasen, the Second Circuit, ap-
plying Florida law, went beyond Diamond and imposed liability on a
noninsider tippee who profited from trading on insider information.75
However, the United States Supreme Court viewed the divided Second
Circuit decision as questionable in light of the "novelty of the question
and the great unsettlement of Florida law,' 7 6 and accordingly certified
the question to the Florida Supreme Court. Although one might have ex-
pected that the only novelty of the decision was its extension to nonin-
71 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
' Id. at 504, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86, 248 N.E.2d at 915-16.
7' Id. at 501, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 83, 248 N.E.2d at 914. For a collection of the relevant com-
mon law authority see the cases cited in Annot., Employer's Right to Earnings or Profits
Made by Employee, 13 A.L.R. 907 (1921).
" 24 N.Y.2d at 499, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82; 248 N.E.2d at 912.
71 Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
"' Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
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sider tippees, the Florida Supreme Court decision purported to con-
stitute a wholesale rejection of Diamond due to the absence of any in-
jury to the corporation, a prerequisite under Florida Law to bringing a
shareholder derivative suit.77 Due to the nature of the derivative suit,
the Florida decision was thus able to ignore the Restatement position as
to the irrrelevance of the lack of damages.78
The fact that the defendants in the Florida case were not insiders or
even corporate employees distinguishes the case from both Brophy and
Diamond where the defendants were agents and fiduciaries of the cor-
porate principal. The defendants thus were no different than the printer
in Chiarella who was held to have owed a duty to disclose or abstain
from trading based merely on the possession of insider information. A
joint venture theory or tort-based aiding and abetting rationale might be
sufficient to hold noninsider tippees accountable under the Brophy-
Diamond rationale,79 at least where there is a knowing participation.
However, since Diamond and Brophy were based on a fiduciary theory,
the decisions cannot be extended easily to hold noninsider tippees ac-
countable. A showing that those profiting from the insider information
knew that it had been obtained wrongfully would present a different and
stronger case for the plaintiff." Schein was decided within the pro-
cedural context of a derivative suit where courts have erected barriers
such as Florida's corporate injury requirement in order to prevent
shareholder strike suits. It is thus an overreading to consider the
Florida decision in Schein as a proper rejection of Diamond as it applies
to corporate fiduciaries on any basis other than the derivative suit in-
jury requirement. This is especially true in light of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency which, as noted above, expressly recognizes the rights to
an accounting of profits even without proof of injury. 1 The obvious im-
propriety of a wholesale rejection of the Brophy-Diamond rationale can
be illustrated by the following example. Consider the case of a corporate
insider who sells information to someone, surely that sale is a breach of
duty and the agent must account to the principal.2 Why should the in-
sider who profits by trading in the stock be treated more leniently?
7 Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739, 746-47 (Fla. 1975).
7' The shareholder derivative suit enables a shareholder to bring suit in the corpora-
tion's behalf to vindicate corporate rights. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; Dent, The Power of
Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw.
U. L. REV. 96 (1980); Prunty, The Shareholders'Derivative Suit. Notes on Its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (1957).
" See Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. Lehman
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). The Second Circuit apparently has retreated from its
decision in Schein to impose liability on noninsider tippees. See Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial
Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275, 278-79 (2d Cir. 1975).
1 Cf. Dirks v. S.E.C., 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1981) (both decided under Rule 10b-5).
" See text accompanying note 73 supra.
See Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952); DOBBS, supra note 66, at 693.
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Unfortunately, the Florida decision does not stand alone. The
Seventh Circuit in Freeman v. Decio83 rejected Diamond on similar facts.
The defendant officers in Freeman who traded on inside information
were held not liable to the corporation under Indiana law, with the court
relying largely upon Florida's rejection of Diamond in Schein.4 The
Seventh Circuit, however, did not take into account the fact that the
Schein decision involved noninsiders and was based on the lack of cor-
porate injury. 5 Furthermore, the tenor of the Seventh Circuit's position
was that the state law should defer to the federal law on insider trading.
There was no federal claim since the corporate plaintiff was not a pur-
chaser or seller of securities and thus could not satisfy Rule 10b-5's stand-
ing requirement.8 Also, the facts in Freeman fell short of establishing
liability under the express provision for insider short-swing profits. 7
The idea of the state's deference to federal law seems questionable in
light of the Supreme Court's recent refusals to federalize issues tradi-
tionally left to state law.88 TheFreeman decision may thus be brought into
question by the increasing reluctance of federal decisions to intrude into
the province of the states. Otherwise the law of insider trading might
fall through a gap created by an "Alphonse and Gaston" routine of the
federal and state courts. Another failing of the Freeman decision may
sound like a law professor's lament, but the court there seemed to lose
track of the basic common law principles involved.
While both the Schein and Freeman cases have been given much
weight in calling the Brophy-Diamond rule into question," there is ample
authority in favor of the common law remedy. Aside from the authority
of the Restatement (Second) of Agency" and the Restatement of the Law
of Restitution,9 there are a number of cases to the same effect. For ex-
ample, the Third Circuit has observed,
'3 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 189.
See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra.
88 The limitations on who can bring suit in a Rule 10b-5 action were set out in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See generally Note, Standing
Under Rule 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MicH. L. REV. 413 (1976).
87 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1981), re-
quires insiders of publicly traded companies to disgorge all profits realized from short-swing
profits (i.e., within six month statutory periods). See generally Hazen, The New
Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1975).
The Freeman court felt that the unavailability of 16(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 should be inter-
preted as a federal statement that the fact situation before it should not be covered as a
matter of policy. 584 F.2d at 190. In contrast, the New York Court in Diamond viewed sec-
tion 16(b) as a strong statement disfavoring insider trading. See 24 N.Y.2d at 502; 301
N.Y.S.2d at 84; 248 N.E.2d at 914.
See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
8" See the authorities cited in notes 6 & 11 supra.
"o See text accompanying note 73 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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We read both Diamond and Brophy to stand for the same fund-
amental proposition: as a matter of common law, a fiduciary of a
corporation who trades for his own benefit on the basis of con-
fidential information acquired through his fiduciary position
breaches his duty to the corporation and may be held accountable
to that corporation for any gains without regard to whether the
corporation suffered damages as a result of the transaction. This
obligation continues even after termination of the relationship
which created the fiduciary duty.2
This common law principle will apply and thus provide a state law
remedy even though the purchaser/seller standing limitations of SEC
Rule 10b-5 would preclude a federal claim by the corporation or one of its
shareholders. 3 Further, while there may be no direct injury to the cor-
poration,94 a remedy should still be recognized since the gravamen of the
evil is the fiduciary's ill-gotten gain rather than the loss to the
principal.95
As the foregoing discussion points out, substantial remedies against
insider trading abuses can be found in traditional common law prin-
ciples. Simply put, nonpublic information concerning a company's fund-
amentals (as opposed to market information)99 or its stock is as much a
part of the corporate property as any tangible asset. An employee,
agent, or even a third party is no more entitled to profit from use of in-
formation than would be the case with a trade secret. Accordingly, the
principal is entitled to restitution of all ill-gotten profits. Although some
courts have rejected this theory of liability for the misuse of inside infor-
mation,97 most decisions have adopted it and at the same time have
recognized its long-standing basis. It follows that many federal cut-
9 Thomas v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 1393, 1397 (3rd Cir. 1975). Accord Davidge v.
White, 377 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying Delaware Law). See also Polin v. Conduc-
tron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 811 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977).
"s See Thomas v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 1393 (3rd Cir. 1975); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
" But see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910
(1969).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, Comment c (1957); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION § 300 (1937). Cf. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90,
102 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Disgorgement is not to compensate investors... [but] is a method of forcing
a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.").
" Fundamental information relates to matters directly involving the internal affairs of
the company, its operations, profitability, and the like. In contrast, market information is
not specific to the company's internal affairs, but relates to extrinsic events that affect the
market price of the company's stock. A change in a company's earnings picture is fundamen-
tal. A third party's decision to acquire a target company is market information, as it does
not relate directly to the company's operations. See note 42 supra. See generally Morrison,
supra note 11.
" See text accompanying notes 75-88 supra.
" See note 12 supra.
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backs on insider trading limitations can and should be remedied by
reliance on the common law. Furthermore, continued recognition of this
common law rationale should bolster federal remedies by providing a
solid basis for imposing a duty to disclose or abstain from trading.
The Supreme Court's continued reference to the common law in in-
terpreting Rule 10b-5 is perpetuated by Chiarella's reliance on the duty
issue. Since there is no relevant federal common law, state law appears
an appropriate reference point for resolving the question. In an insider
trading case where the plaintiff satisfies Rule 10b-5's purchaser/seller
standing requirement, a cause of action should lie assuming the defendant
insider acted with the requisite scienter. The duty to speak that is ad-
dressed in the cases discussed above is grounded in fiduciary principles
rather than common law fraud and this should not preclude the 10b-5
remedy. Since the breach of duty is based upon a non-disclosure, section
10(b)'s deception requirement would appear to be satisfied.9 According-
ly, the common law presents a viable way to find an actionable duty to
speak under Rule 10b-5. This is not an across-the-board duty but a duty
that will arise only on appropriate facts as is indicated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Chiarella. In addition to the federal impact, therefore,
the fiduciary duty rationale has a definite role to play under state law.
The federal and state remedies against insider trading should be
"parallel" and "non-exclusive.""' Since the evils of insider trading offend
both common law and federal securities laws, the divergent policies
behind each should be complementary.
" See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), where the Court held that a
breach of fiduciary duty standing alone will not support a Rule 10b-5 claim but the rule is
otherwise when there is a nondisclosure of material facts in connection therewith. See also
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Gas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
10 See Haft, supra note 11, at 1070.
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